Good Glove, No hit: Brett Lawrie

That isn’t intended to be a sarcastic title. Perhaps a little inflammatory, but is correct, as of the third week of April. I can’t say I put much stock in the numbers of anybody with the bat at this time of year, but he’s been a below average hitter so far. The glove has, to my eyes, been outstanding. And I don’t think the glove really slumps. Brett does two things that seem to me to show off his raw skill on defense.

First, when he bobbles or blocks a ball, he neither panics or gives up. His recovery is quick, and the resulting throw is still on target. Second he does this:

Sadly, you’ll have to click the pic to see the show.

Image

The entire sequence, from contact with glove, to release, takes one second. Also, in one frame, he appears to have discovered levitation.

So, please discuss, what were you expecting with the bat and the glove to start the year? Do you think he’ll ever get caught stealing home again? Has he left you wanting more?

Comment section is right down there.

What does blowing a lead look like?

Couple of quick thoughts on the Red Sox/Yankees tilt today. The one in which the Sox could not protect a 9 run lead. I’m not going to try to get the proper adjective for that kind of thing. I don’t think that word exists. I’m just going to show you two pictures.

The following are win probability graphs, from Fangraphs.com, they illustrate the level of certainty that one team has of winning the game. The first inning begins with the home team at a little better than 50% chance, and eventually the graph ends at one team’s side, top for the home team, bottom for the visitors. The sharper and more frequent the spikes, the more varied and exciting the game action.

The first graph is from a Blue Jays game last year, a game in which they scored seven runs against Felix Hernandez, and then allowed eight unanswered to lose in the bottom of the 9th.

Image

Note that, until the very last two plays of the game, the Blue Jays still had a better than 50% chance of pulling that one out of the fire. The bar graph on the bottom indicates how much impact each subsequent at-bat has in the game. Red bars are game-changing at bats, little bumps are low stress situations. The last five Seattle batters all came up with the game in their hands.  It was a crushing defeat, and a failure in the final moment that left a bit of an empty feeling in my gut.

This is from today’s game, NYY at BOS:

Image

It is just a crazy line. The Red Sox are hovering at near 99% certainty of winning, and then the 6th and 7th innings completely destroy their chances, swinging the odds the Yankee’s way in just as extreme a fashion. The leverage bars at the bottom of the graph blip only once after the 7-run 7th. Boston went down to the mat, hard, and stayed there.

I doubt that I’ll see anything quite like that reversal any time soon. I bet Bobby V. is hoping exactly the same thing.

Box Score Blues : The shift and the scoresheet

This post is about Carlos Pena, speed demon, spray hitter. Now, if you follow MLB at all you might be checking, shortly, to see if there is a hot young prospect named Carlos Pena, tearing it up in the minor leagues somewhere. Don’t worry, I’m talking about the Tampa Bay Ray’s, (and one time Cub’s), first baseman, with whom you are most likely familiar. Having seen Pena in action, you would be quick to argue with me about his status as a speed threat. Also, he pulls the baseball on the ground most of the time. He does, after all, have only 25 stolen bases in almost 5,000 career plate appearances. But, let us imagine that you and I have never seen Pena play, and we have only scoresheet data to refer to. Are you imagining it? Good, let’s look at the last couple of games for Carlos Pena, real quick like.

This Monday, April 17th, Pena began the game with a line drive deep to right, and was thrown out trying to stretch a single into a double. In his second at-bat, he reached by bunting for a base hit to the third base side. In his third at bat he struck out swinging. In his fourth at-bat, he reached on a bunt base hit to the third base side.

On Tuesay, April 18th, Pena recorded a flyout in each of his first 2 AB, to centre and left. Then grounded out to the third baseman. Struck out while fouling a bunt off with two strikes with the bases empty, and walked in his final plate appearance.

Three attempts to bunt for a base hit, thrown out trying to take an extra base, and a groundout to the third baseman. This makes it look like Pena is blessed with a great set of wheels, and can willingly spray the ball around the park. And it is completely wrong. It is all smoke and mirrors, created by the convention we call ‘scorekeeping’.

Even if you have never kept score in a baseball game, you have seen the numbers. On a lineup card, sometimes on a TV broadcast. The pitcher is assigned number 1 as his position. The sequence continues around the diamond, ending with the right fielder assigned number 9. The numbers are a shorthand, and were developed in the 1870′s as the game itself was taking shape. These simple numbers are like a baseball alphabet, and tell a story about every play in the game. When we see 1-3 on the scoresheet of a game, we know the pitcher fielder the ball himself and threw it to the first baseman to record the out. It draws a simple picture that anyone can use to help reconstruct a game later on.

It seems that this year, though, that simple picture is being manipulated by the latest fad in baseball defense. A fad started in the 1940′s that’s making a comeback, the infield shift.

Don’t think its a thing? Well everybody seems to be writing about it right now. There’s the Blue Jays, the Cubbies, and the standard bearers for this technique, Joe Maddon and Company, also known as the Tampa Bay Rays. Scattering defenders around the diamond changes a lot of things. If the fad turns into something more than a one year blip, it won’t just be Carlos Pena’s stats that will be affected in unusual ways.

So, let’s look at why the infield shift has turned Pena’s results on their heads. First, Pena is bunting for a base hit because the third baseman is 150 feet away, in right field. Standard scorekeeping maintains that any ball to the player ‘at third’ is assigned to whoever was placed ‘at third’ when the lineup was written. So Pena’s bunting is a reflection of a big hole in the field, not of his speed. When Pena was thrown out stretching the single, his line drive was fielded by a right fielder playing almost on the warning track. He could afford to play that deep because his ‘shallow’ territory was being occupied by the third baseman. Pena’s groundout to 3B was not another attempt to ‘take the ball the other way’. It was pulled, on the ground, between first and second. Again, the third baseman playing on the wrong side of the diamond.

Beyond these types of effects are the effects on fielding statistics. For example, Ultimate Zone Rating is a newer fielding statistic. It divides the field into zones, and assigns each fielder responsibility for those zones. I can only assume that the unmodified data from UZR would penalize the third baseman for not fielding the bunt attempts, and reward him for a play that’s miles out of his zone behind first base. Later in the game, Yunel Escobar, the shortstop, was playing shallow, and had a shot a fielding a Pena bunt. How often does a shortstop make a play on a bunt in normal alignment? Never.

Will all this peter out in a few months? Will it go the way of the split fingered fastball, or the steal of home? I’m not sure. It will depend on whether or not teams believe it is helping them win games. If it becomes the norm, we may be on the leading edge of a change to the way baseball plays are recorded for the posterity. A shifted infield is not possible to describe in the standard language of the scoresheet.  If it does do away with the standard number assignments in favour of some other shorthand, it will be the first significant change to that system in over 100 years.

 

Slumping sluggers

11 games in and the superstar outfielder has, compared to what people are used to seeing from him, struggled. He’s coming off a season in which he was arguably robbed of the MVP award — I mean, just look. He led the league in home runs, walks, OPS+ and intentional walks.

But now, 11 games in, his team is at 6-5 and some fans are kind of freaking out. He’s got a sub-.800 OPS. In a little more than 50 plate appearances and he’s only hit two home runs! Should we be worried? Is he finished?

Am I writing about Jose Bautista? No, although all of the above applies to him.

In 1959, Mickey Mantle was in the exact same situation. Well, I say exact, but I don’t know for sure what the fans were saying about him. Other than that, it was pretty much the same. Really, check out the stats!

(Click the pics to embiggen, or the links to see the source at Baseball Reference.)

Mantle’s 1958:

Bautista’s 2011:

Mantle’s first 11 games of 1959:

Bautista’s first 11 of 2012:

Obviously Bautista is not Mantle, but to everybody out there worrying about Bautista: Don’t. It’s way, way too early yet. If you hear people talk about small sample size, listen to them. If you don’t want to believe them, remember the above stats — and remember this: Despite his slow start in ’59, Mantle went on to hit 31 home runs and post on OPS of .904. It wasn’t Mantle’s best season, but it was still very, very productive.

Louisville Slugger, the making of

The first baseball bat I ever owned was a black Louisville Slugger. It had white tape wrapped around the handle for grip. When I started playing organized ball, and aluminum bats became an option, I didn’t look back. Why would I? Aluminum makes the ball fly!

But that Slugger, it holds a special place in my heart. I’m sure I’m not alone in feeling like this about the old wooden bats.

I guess I had always assumed the bats were made by a dude with a lathe. Until relatively recently, I would have been correct. But no more! Wired recently toured the Louisville Slugger factory and the footage they came back with is pretty interesting. Babe Ruth-bat interesting, even!

Brandon Morrow, then and now.

The Blue Jays acquired Brandon Morrow over the winter of 2009-2010. He came to the Blue Jays with a wicked fastball, and almost total inability to find the strike zone. He walked 26 batters in his first 35 innings. Then Bruce Walton and he decided it would be prudent to drop his arm slot.

Morrow’s fortunes turned around, and he’s been the Blue Jays’ de facto ‘Number 2′ starter ever since. He has had his ups and downs, but after a strong finish to last season he seemed mentally ready to take the ‘Ace’ label and run with it. He signed a 20 million dollar extension over the winter of 2011/2012. His quotes from that day, (go ahead, click the link, I’ll be here when you come back), indicate his confidence was quite high. Mine would be too, on the day I got extended.

I was curious to see what Brandon Morrow had actually changed in the 400 or more innings he’s logged since 2010. Especially since there was all the excitement last year over his having developed a cut fastball.

So, just for fun, I grabbed 2 months from Brooksbaseball.net and took a look at Morrow’s pitch selection, and the kinds of outcomes he’s generated from his pitches. I took June of 2010, the first full month after the arm slot change, and the first 2 starts of 2012.

First, the pitch mix.

First off, the sinker has disappeared. From 18% of the time to 2%. It also doesn’t sink nearly as much when he does use it, with three inches less vertical break than back in the old days. Second, the four-seam fastball is much straighter, with only 2 inches of horizontal movement now, compared to almost 7 inches in 2010. The rest of his pitch usage is quite similar, and the change-up has really been falling off the table, with 7 more inches of vertical break. The cutter? Don’t see it on the chart do we?

Now, Brandon started 5 games in June of 2010, and only 2 so far this month, so when we chart outcomes, 2012 is only looking at a good game against the Indians, and a homer happy night at Rogers Centre against Baltimore. I should probably revisit this chart in May.

From the top down, the first thing I would note is that the lack of movement on the fastball has had a huge impact on Morrow’s results. When the whiffs go from 28% to 11%, all that contact has to go somewhere. Same number of grounders, and a 15% jump in fly balls means a bunch of balls leaving the yard. The change-up used to be one of his better groundball options, but even with the extra break I noted above, two-thirds of those that are hit are getting lifted in the air too. Also interesting, its only a 46 pitch sample over these 2 months, but none of Morrow’s curveballs were put in the air, maybe that’s his better double-play inducing pitch.

So, to summarize, the fastball looks almost as hard, but much too straight.I would think he has, indeed made an effort to master the change-up, but it hasn’t got him a single whiff yet this year. Looks like the cutter was an experiment that’s been put on the shelf for now.

I am fascinated by Morrow and his electric arm, so I’ll be sure to come back to this in a couple of weeks and see what adjustments he’s made. Hope you’ll join me.

Butterfield’s Secret

First off, go to The Toronto Star and read this article on Brian Butterfield, because he deserves all the ink he gets, and more.

Observe the piture at the top carefully, though. I have some experience with Adobe, and it appears to be ‘shopped. I can tell by some of the pixels. After forensically reverse engineering the process, I bring you the unedited photo. Behold!

Continue reading